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Non-technical summary 
It has almost become conventional wisdom that the viability of modern open science norms 
and practices depends on public disclosure of new knowledge, methods, and materials.  At 
the same time, long-run trends suggest a broad shift is taking place in the institutional 
financing structure that supports academic research.  According to data compiled by the 
OECD, industry sources are financing a growing share of academic research while “core” 
public funding is generally shrinking.  This ongoing shift from public to private sponsorship 
is a cause for concern because these sponsorship relationships are fundamentally different.  
Available evidence suggests that industry financing does not simply replace dwindling public 
money, but imposes additional restrictions on academic researchers.  In particular, industry 
sponsors frequently limit disclosure of research findings, methods, or materials by delaying 
or banning public release.   
Hence, in this paper we examine the relationship between industry sponsorship and 
restrictions on disclosure using individual-level data on German academic researchers.  Our 
results show a strong positive relationship between the degree of publication restrictions and 
the share of industry sponsorship.  The percentage of respondents who reported higher 
secrecy (partial or full) is significantly larger for industry sponsored researchers than it is for 
researchers with other extramural sponsors, 41% and 7% respectively.  Holding other factors 
constant, a 10% increase in a researcher‟s share of industry sponsorship increases the 
probability that he or she will experience publication delay or secrecy by 4.4 percentage 
points.  In this respect, our results shed light on an important challenge facing policymakers. 
Understanding the trade-off between public and private sponsorship of academic research 
involves gauging the impact of disclosure restrictions on the quantity, quality, and evolution 
of academic research to better understand how these restrictions may ultimately influence 
innovation and economic growth. 
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Ein offenes Wissenschaftssystem ist abhängig von der Verbreitung neuen Wissens, neuer 
Methoden und Materialien. Langfristige Trends lassen jedoch erkennen, dass sich die 
institutionelle Finanzierungsstruktur in der öffentlichen Forschung deutlich ändert. So zeigen 
Statistiken der OECD, dass ein steigender Anteil der Forschung durch die Privatwirtschaft 
finanziert wird, während die öffentliche Grundfinanzierung in der Regel sinkt. Diese 
Veränderung in der Finanzierungsstruktur ist problematisch, weil fundamentale Unterschiede 
in den Beziehungen zwischen Zuwendungsgeber und Empfänger bestehen. So weisen 
Studien nach, dass eine Finanzierung durch die Privatwirtschaft nicht einfach eine 
schrumpfende öffentliche Förderung ersetzt, sondern in der Regel mit bestimmten 
Restriktionen für die Forscher verbunden ist. Insbesondere hemmen Sponsoren aus der 
Privatwirtschaft oftmals die Verbreitung von Forschungsergebnissen, -methoden oder -
materialien durch Verzögerung oder Verbot der Veröffentlichung.  
In dieser Studie untersuchen wir auf der Basis von Individualdaten deutscher Wissenschaftler 
die Beziehung zwischen einer Finanzierung von Forschung durch die Privatwirtschaft und 
den Restriktionen, denen die Verbreitung von Forschung unterworfen ist. Unsere Ergebnisse 
weisen einen stark positiven Zusammenhang zwischen den Publikationsrestriktionen und 
dem Anteil der Finanzierung durch die Privatwirtschaft nach. So ist der Anteil der Forscher, 
die sich einem höheren Ausmaß an Restriktionen gegenüber sehen, mit 41% signifikant höher 
als er es für Forscher mit anderen Finanzierungsquellen ist (7%). Eine Erhöhung des 
Finanzierungsanteils durch die Privatwirtschaft um 10% wirkt sich so beispielsweise auf eine 
um 4,4% erhöhte Wahrscheinlichkeit von Restriktionen aus. Unsere Ergebnisse weisen damit 
auf eine Problematik hin, der sich die Forschungs- und Innovationspolitik stellen muss, will 
sie auch weiterhin die freie Verbreitung von Forschungsergebnissen und ein offenen 
Wissenschaftssystem sichern. 
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Abstract 
The viability of modern open science norms and practices depend on public 
disclosure of new knowledge, methods, and materials.  Aggregate data from the 
OECD show a broad shift in the institutional financing structure that supports 
academic research from public to private sponsorship.  This paper examines the 
relationship between industry sponsorship and restrictions on disclosure using 
individual-level data on German academic researchers.  Accounting for self-
selection into extramural sponsorship, our evidence strongly supports the 
perspective that industry sponsorship jeopardizes public disclosure of academic 
research.   
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1 Introduction 
Long-run trends suggest a broad shift is taking place in the institutional financing structure 
that supports academic research.  According to data compiled by the OECD, industry sources 
are financing a growing share of academic research while “core” public funding is generally 
shrinking.
1
  This ongoing shift from public to private sponsorship is a cause for concern 
because these sponsorship relationships are fundamentally different.  Available evidence 
suggests that industry financing does not simply replace dwindling public money, but 
imposes additional restrictions on academic researchers.  In particular, industry sponsors 
frequently limit disclosure of research findings, methods, or materials by delaying or banning 
public release (Blumenthal et al. 1996, Cohen et al. 1998, Thursby and Thursby 2007). 
 Recent economic research highlights why public disclosure of academic research is 
important.  Disclosure permits the “stock of public knowledge” to be cumulative, accessible, 
and reliable.  It limits duplication of research efforts, allows new knowledge to be replicated 
and verified by professional peers, and permits access and use by other researchers which 
enhances opportunities for complementary research (Dasgupta and David 1994).  In recent 
work, Murray et al. (2009) found that greater access to ideas and materials in academic 
research not only increased incentives for direct follow-on research, but led to an increase in 
the diversity of research by increasing the number of experimental research lines.  Mukherjee 
and Stern (2009), who examined the theoretical conditions supporting “open science” versus 
“secrecy”, stressed that maintaining and growing the stock of public knowledge requires a 
limit on the private financial returns obtained through secrecy.   
                                               
1 OECD data show the share of industry sponsorship has grown in all countries since 1980, although this 
share is still relatively small.  General university funds (“core” funds) as a share of civilian government budget 
appropriations fell from 26% in 1995 to 23% in 2007 (OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2010).  
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 This paper examines the relationship between industry sponsorship and restrictions on 
disclosure using individual-level data on German academic researchers.  Germany is an apt 
setting for examining this relationship.  It has a strong tradition of public financial support for 
academic research and, among advanced economies, Germany experienced the most dramatic 
growth in its share of industry sponsorship, a 13.4 percentage point increase from 1995 to 
2007 (OECD 2010).  German academic researchers were surveyed about the degree of 
disclosure restrictions on publications experienced during sponsored research projects.  To 
examine if industry sponsorship jeopardizes disclosure of academic research, we modeled the 
degree of restrictiveness (i.e. delay, partial secrecy, and complete secrecy) as a function of the 
researcher‟s budget share financed by industry.  Using the share of industry sponsorship 
mirrors the shift in institutional financing highlighted by the OECD data and advances the 
literature beyond the use of simple indicator variable formulations.  Our models also take into 
account non-industry extramural sponsorship, personal characteristics, research 
characteristics, institutional affiliations, and scientific fields of study. 
 Both the descriptive and regression results show a strong positive relationship 
between the degree of publication restrictions and the share of industry sponsorship.  The 
percentage of respondents who reported higher secrecy (partial or full) is significantly larger 
for industry sponsored researchers than it is for researchers with other extramural sponsors, 
41% and 7% respectively.  Holding other factors constant, a 10% increase in a researcher‟s 
share of industry sponsorship increases the probability that he or she will experience 
publication delay or secrecy by 4.4 percentage points, which is a 17.4% increase in the 
predicted probability that an “average” researcher will experience publication delay or 
secrecy.  This result is robust to the possibility that researchers self-select into extramural 
sponsorship and to the possibility that the share of industry sponsorship is endogenous due to 
unobserved variables.  Based on our analysis, the shift from public to private sponsorship 
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seen in the OECD aggregate data reflect changes in the microeconomic environment shaping 
incentives for disclosure by academic researchers.  On average, academic researchers are 
willing to restrict disclosure in exchange for financial support by industry sponsors.  Our 
results shed light on an important challenge facing policymakers. Understanding the trade-off 
between public and private sponsorship of academic research involves gauging the impact of 
disclosure restrictions on the quantity, quality, and evolution of academic research to better 
understand how these restrictions may ultimately influence innovation and economic growth.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section summarizes the current 
literature on sponsorship of academic research.  The researcher-level data, estimation issues 
and methods are discussed in section 3.  The results and concluding remarks appear in 
sections 4 and 5, respectively.  
2 Sponsorship of Academic Research 
More than a simple transfer of funds, sponsorship of academic research involves contractual 
relationships that often specify the nature, ownership, and control rights for research findings, 
methods, or materials.  While these contracts are necessarily “incomplete” due to a number of 
informational problems, they reflect negotiated outcomes between sponsors and researchers 
that can have far reaching implications for the organization and conduct of academic 
research.  Historically, as argued by David (2004), sponsorship relationships helped to 
transform the norms, incentives, and organizational structures of scientific inquiry from a 
system dominated by secrecy to a modern “open science” system characterized by rapid 
public disclosure of new knowledge.
2
  Relative to a secrecy system, open science is 
                                               
2 Open science is broadly associated with universities and other not-for-profit research institutions that 
practice the “priority” reward system and support the professional ethos associated with the community of 
academic scientists as articulated by sociologist Robert K. Merton (see, for instance, Merton 1973, Dasgupta 
and David 1994, Stephan 1996).  David (2004) highlights the norms of “universalism” (open entry and 
discourse) and “communism” (full and open disclosure) as particularly relevant to openness.  
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considered to be an efficient and welfare enhancing system for the production of a 
cumulative, accessible, and reliable stock of public scientific and technical knowledge 
(Dasgupta and David 1994, Mukherjee and Stern 2008). 
As history suggests, the objectives and institutional reward systems practiced by 
different sponsors may influence the norms, incentives, and organizational structures of 
academic research differently.  “Public” sponsors such as science-oriented state agencies or 
private foundations focus on advancing public knowledge.  These institutions expect 
sponsored research to result in new knowledge that is publicly disclosed through various 
channels including publication.  In fact, public support often depends on a satisfactory 
performance as indicated by a researcher‟s publication output.  Advancing public knowledge 
through disclosure is consistent with the “priority” reward system and reinforces open science 
norms and behaviours.  In contrast, “private” sponsors such as military-oriented state 
agencies or private industry focus on extracting rents from new knowledge by restricting 
public disclosure.
3
  Advocating restrictions on disclosure is likely to have a corrosive effect 
on open science. 
 One approach to learning about sponsorship relationships is to ask the sponsors.  We 
found two published studies that surveyed private firms about the characteristics of sponsored 
research contracts.
4
  Based on survey responses from 210 life science companies, Blumenthal 
et al. (1996) found evidence of both publication delay and secrecy (nondisclosure) 
restrictions on information resulting from academic research.  For instance, fifty-eight 
percent of the companies typically required researchers to keep information confidential for 
                                               
3 Gans et al. (2010) use a theoretical framework to examine the “regimes” of disclosure under private 
industry sponsorship. 
4 We did not find any studies that systematically analyze the contractual terms of scientific or military-
oriented contracts from state sponsors or private foundations.  Cohen at al. (1998) reported that 53 percent of 
university-industry research centers allowed firms to impose publication delays and 35 percent allowed firms to 
impose secrecy through the deletion of information before publishing.  For a sample of 130 French public labs 
that have 875 industrial partners, Goddard and Isabelle (2006) reported that 55% allowed contract provisions to 
delay publication and 53% allowed contract provisions to suppress information from publication.  
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more than six months.  Using survey responses from 112 firms engaged in university 
licensing, Thursby and Thursby (2007) reported that ninety percent of the university contracts 
included publication delay clauses. 
A more direct approach, which is followed in this paper, is to ask academic 
researchers about any disclosure restrictions they experienced when undertaking extramurally 
sponsored research.  We found six studies that used researcher-level survey data to shed light 
on the relationship between industry sponsorship and disclosure.  In five of these studies, 
Blumenthal and colleagues described the results of three separate life science faculty surveys 
conducted between 1985 and 2000 (Blumenthal et al.1986, 1996a,b , 1997, 2006; Campbell 
et al. 2002).  Their findings show that researchers with at least one industry sponsored project 
are more likely to report industry ownership of research results, pre-publication review, 
publication delays, and secrecy to protect proprietary information.
5
  Taking a slightly 
different perspective, Hong and Walsh (2009) ask researchers how “safe” they feel about 
discussing their current work with non-collaborating colleagues.  For their full sample, 
academic researchers with at least one industry sponsored project were more likely to feel 
“unsafe” (interpreted as being more secretive). 
Our analysis extends this mostly descriptive literature in three ways.  First, we expand 
the scope of evidence by analyzing academic researchers who work outside the United States 
in a broader set of scientific fields and institutional settings.  All of the prior work analyzing 
how industry sponsorship influences disclosure looked at U.S. researchers working in a 
handful of scientific fields at American universities.  Dasgupta and David (1994) highlighted 
how alternative institutional settings may influence a researcher‟s choice about disclosure.  
Second, to account for heterogeneity in the degree of industry sponsorship, our analysis uses 
the budget share of industry support instead of a simple indicator variable formulation.  
                                               
5 Using an industry funding indicator, Walsh et al. (2007) found no relationship between industry funding 
and compliance with requests for research inputs among biomedical researchers performing genomic and 
proteomic-related research. 
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Third, our empirical analysis is the first to address potential self-selection by academic 
researchers into extramural sponsorship and to use an instrumental variables method to 
account for unobserved factors.   
3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Data 
To analyze the relationship between industry sponsorship and disclosure restrictions on 
publications we used a researcher-level database.  In 2008, the Centre for European 
Economic Research (ZEW) undertook an online survey of German academic researchers.  
The survey population was defined to include German researchers who held a Ph.D. degree 
and worked at either a university or a not-for-profit research institution.  Information on 
university affiliated researchers was collected from a register of German professors 
(“Hochschullehrerverzeichnis”) which excludes universities of applied sciences that focus on 
teaching.  For Germany‟s largest not-for-profit research institutions (Fraunhofer Society, Max 
Planck Society, Helmholtz Association, Leibniz Association), information on affiliated 
researchers was collected using internet searches.
6
   
In total, the survey led to 1,404 valid responses. After dropping observations with 
missing values in the variables of interest for this study, we end up with a final sample of 
1,060 observations.  
 The dependent variable is drawn from a question that asked respondents to indicate 
the degree of disclosure restrictions on publications resulting from extramural sponsorship.  It 
                                               
6 Major research institutions in Germany are not only universities but other public research institutions 
that have many branches in a variety of different scientific disciplines. For instance, the Fraunhofer Society has 
59 institutes in Germany with about 17,000 employees, the Max-Planck Society has 76 institutes with about 
12,000 employees. The Leibniz Association employs 16,100 people in 86 research centres.The Helmholtz 
Association has about 30,000 employees in 16 research centres. University professors are frequently heads of 
research groups at these institutions, i.e. they have a university affiliation but are typically on leave full-time 
when working with the research institutes. 
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asked: “Has the funding of your research by public or private extramural sponsors resulted in: 
(a) a complete ban on publishing research; (b) a partial ban on publishing research; or (c) a 
delay in publishing research due to contractual agreements.”  Respondents could check one of 
three boxes for each outcome indicating “yes”, “no”, or “not relevant”.  For the empirical 
analysis, we coded two alternative dependent variables based on this question.  The first is a 
dummy variable indicating the respondent experienced any delay or secrecy due to 
extramural funding.  This binary variable takes the value of one if the respondent indicated 
“yes” to any of the outcomes.  The second is an ordered variable with four categories 
indicating higher levels of secrecy:  no delay or ban, delay of publications, partial ban on 
publication, and total ban on publication. 
The main explanatory variable in the analysis is the share of the researcher‟s 
extramural budget funded by private industry sponsors.  This variable was constructed using 
two survey questions.  The first question asked the researcher to report his or her total 
extramural budget over the five year period from 2002 to 2006.  Conditional on having 
extramural funding, the second question asked the researcher to provide the source (as a 
percentage) of his or her total extramural budget over the five year period.  The share of 
industry sponsorship is the proportion of researcher‟s budget funded by private sector 
organizations. 
We used a number of other variables collected through the survey as controls or 
instrumental variables in the empirical analysis.  These variables are grouped into four 
categories:  research characteristics, personal characteristics, institutional affiliations, and 
scientific fields of study.  Research characteristics relate to the individual‟s position at the 
research institution, his or her total extramural funding, publications, patent applications, and 
his or her opinion about the peer review process.  Personal characteristics include the 
individual‟s age and gender, and whether he or she is tenured.  Institutional affiliations cover 
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universities, the four major not-for-profit public research institutions mentioned above, and a 
catchall group for all other affiliations.  Further, the researchers were grouped into four broad 
scientific fields specified as life sciences, natural sciences, engineering, and social sciences.   
3.2 Methods 
In the ideal case, we would use an experimental design to identify the causal effect of 
industry sponsorship on disclosure choices by academic researchers.  For instance, one might 
randomly assign industry sponsorship to academic researchers, allow for negotiation and 
research, and observe changes in disclosure.  This type of experiment would eliminate any 
bias due to self-section by academic researchers into funding.  Our survey data, however, 
were not collected using a randomized experimental design.  With our data, we do not 
observe the choice by an academic researcher to seek or accept extramural sponsorship and 
this suggests simple Probit and ordered Probit estimators could be biased by self-section.  
Academic researchers who received extramural funding are probably different from those 
who did not receive funding.  For instance, researchers who are less concerned about 
disclosure or perform more “applied” research may be more willing to accept extramural 
sponsorship that imposes disclosure restrictions.
7
  This would lead to an upward bias.  To 
address this possibility, our empirical analysis includes Probit and ordered Probit models 
accounting for selection into funding.  In these models, the academic researcher‟s age and 
gender serve as exclusion restrictions that predict the receipt of extramural funding, but do 
not influence the researcher‟s disclosure outcome.  These exclusion restrictions are supported 
                                               
7 Define Y0i as the non-disclosure (or secrecy) outcome for academic researcher i in the state of not 
receiving extramural funding and define Di as the funding indicator:  Di=1 when funded and Di=0 when not 
funded.  Selection bias is positive when those who actually received funding value non-disclosure more in the 
unfunded state: 
0 0[ | 1] [ | 0] 0i i i iE Y D E Y D    . 
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statistically. Neither gender nor age significantly influence disclosure restrictions on 
publications once other factors are held constant.
8
  
While our survey instrument provides fairly rich researcher-level information, we do 
not observe the researcher‟s perception of scientific competition within his or her field.  
Current studies find that greater scientific competition is associated with greater secrecy 
(Hong and Walsh 2009, Haeussler 2011).  Relevant for this analysis, however, is the 
relationship between scientific competition and extramural sponsorship.  Scientific 
competition may either increase or decrease the attractiveness of extramural sponsorship.  On 
the one hand, researchers feeling intense competition for priority may be less willing to 
accept third party disclosure restrictions.  On the other hand, extramural sponsorship may 
provide financial resources that help the researcher get work done faster.  The direction of 
potential bias could go either way.  In our analysis, we included scientific field dummy 
variables to capture differences in the level of scientific competition across fields.  
Standard descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression models are 
reported in Table 1. 
                                               
8 In addition to being statistically valid, other research on academic sharing behaviors and attitudes 
toward cooperation with private firms do not find gender to be significant (Haeussler 2011, Audretsch et al. 
2010).  Haeussler (2011) finds that a researcher‟s age decreases the percent of requested information that is 
shared. 
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Table 1: Regression descriptive statistics 
Data used in selection equation (N = 1,060) 
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
    Any extramural sponsorship 0.808 0.394 0 1 
Research Characteristics 
        Research group leader 0.722 0.448 0 1
    Journal publications 21.420 26.920 0 178 
    Patent applications 0.749 2.101 0 24 
Personal Characteristics 
        Tenure 0.842 0.364 0 1
    Female 0.148 0.355 0 1 
    Age  49.531 8.225 28 74 
Institutions 
        University 0.586 0.493 0 1
    Fraunhofer Society 0.051 0.220 0 1 
    Max Planck Society 0.085 0.279 0 1 
    Helmholtz Association 0.165 0.371 0 1 
    Leibniz Association 0.070 0.255 0 1 
    Other Institution 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Science Fields 
        Life sciences 0.305 0.461 0 1 
    Natural sciences 0.292 0.455 0 1 
    Engineering 0.192 0.394 0 1 
    Social sciences 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Data used in withholding regressions (N = 856) 
Dependent variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
    Delay or ban (ordered variable) 0.560 0.957 0 3 
    Delay or ban (dummy variable) 0.289 0.453 0 1 
Research Characteristics 
        Industry share 0.111 0.212 0 1
    Total budget (million Euro) 1.695 3.738 0.001 75 
    Research group leader 0.792 0.406 0 1 
    Journal publications 23.557 28.125 0 176 
    Patent applications 0.836 2.215 0 24 
Personal Characteristics 
        Tenure 0.864 0.342 0 1
Institutions 
        University 0.613 0.487 0 1
    Fraunhofer Society 0.051 0.221 0 1 
    Max Planck Society 0.074 0.261 0 1 
    Helmholtz Association 0.152 0.359 0 1 
    Leibniz Association 0.065 0.247 0 1 
    Other Institution 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Science Fields 
        Life sciences 0.299 0.458 0 1 
    Natural sciences 0.292 0.455 0 1 
    Engineering 0.210 0.408 0 1 
    Social sciences 0.199 0.399 0 1 
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4 Results 
4.1 Main results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of German researchers and for 
subsamples broken out by extramural funding.  Most respondents indicated some extramural 
sponsorship (81%) with nearly one third having industry sponsorship.  On average, 
researchers with industry sponsorship had larger research budgets, published more in 
journals, and applied for more patents.  Personal characteristics of researchers were similar 
except for a significant drop in the proportion of females for the group of industry sponsored 
researchers.  A greater proportion of university and Fraunhofer affiliated researchers reported 
industry sponsorship while the proportion of industry sponsored researchers is quite small for 
affiliates of the Max Planck Society, which is strongly oriented toward basic research.  
Among the science fields, industry sponsorship was greatest in engineering. 
Next we examined the average values of the covariates for different levels of 
restriction (no delay or secrecy, delay, partial or full secrecy) grouped by extramural, 
industry, and non-industry sponsorship as shown in Table 3.  Out of the 341 respondents that 
reported some industry sponsorship, 50% reported no delay or secrecy on publications, 9% 
reported a delay, and 41% reported a partial or full secrecy on publications.  The percentage 
of respondents who reported the higher secrecy (partial or full) is significantly (at the 1% 
level) larger for industry sponsored researchers than it is for researchers with non-industry 
sponsorship, 41% and 7% respectively.  The positive association between industry share and 
level of secrecy is already evident in Table 3.  As one looks across the columns from no 
restrictions (no delay/ban) to higher secrecy (partial/full), researchers reported larger industry 
sponsorship shares.  Higher secrecy was reported more frequently by researchers affiliated 
with applied public research organizations such as the Fraunhofer Society and Helmholtz 
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Association.  Among the science fields, the proportion who reported partial or total secrecy 
on publishing is greatest in engineering. 
Table 2: Sample averages for all covariates by extramural sponsorship 
  
All No External Any External Industry 
    Respondents Funding Funding Funding 
Total Observations (% of all obs) 
 
1060 204 (19%) 856 (81%) 341 (32%) 
Report a delay or ban of research 
  
- 0.289 0.504 
Research Characteristics 
         Industry share 
 
- - 0.111 0.279 
    Total budget (million Euro) 
 
- - 1.695 2.163 
    Research group leader 
 
0.722 0.426 0.792 0.862 
    Journal publications  
 
21.42 12.451 23.557 26.595 
    Patent applications 
 
0.749 0.382 0.836 1.537 
Personal Characteristics 
         Tenure 
 
0.842 0.75 0.864 0.918 
    Female 
 
0.148 0.176 0.141 0.088 
    Age  
 
49.5 50.4 49.3 50.2 
Institutions 
         University 
 
0.586 0.471 0.613 0.642 
    Fraunhofer Society 
 
0.051 0.049 0.051 0.117 
    Max Planck Society 
 
0.085 0.132 0.074 0.035 
    Helmholtz Association 
 
0.165 0.221 0.152 0.106 
    Leibniz Association 
 
0.07 0.088 0.065 0.053 
    Other Institution 
 
0.087 0.098 0.084 0.073 
Science Fields 
         Life sciences 
 
0.305 0.328 0.299 0.279 
    Natural sciences 
 
0.292 0.294 0.292 0.214 
    Engineering 
 
0.192 0.113 0.21 0.378 
    Social sciences 
 
0.211 0.265 0.199 0.129 
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Table 3: Sample averages by level of publication restriction and type of extramural sponsorship 
  
Any External Funding (N=856) Industry Funding (N=341) Non-Industry Funding (N=515) 
    
No Delay or 
Ban Delay 
Partial or 
Full Ban 
No Delay or 
Ban Delay 
Partial or 
Full Ban 
No Delay or 
Ban Delay 
Partial or 
Full Ban 
Total Observations (%) 
 
609 (71%) 69 (8%) 178 (21%) 169 (50%) 32 (9%) 140 (41%) 440 (85%) 37 (7%) 38 (7%) 
Research Characteristics 
   
  
  
  
       Industry share 
 
0.067 0.116 0.26 0.241 0.25 0.331 - - - 
    Total budget (million Euro) 
 
1.517 1.633 2.327 1.993 1.938 2.42 1.334 1.370 1.982 
    Research group leader 
 
0.788 0.841 0.787 0.882 0.938 0.821 0.752 0.757 0.658 
    Journal publications  25.504 27.507 15.365 34.64 34.906 14.979 21.993 21.108 16.789 
    Patent applications 
 
0.473 1.551 1.803 0.941 2.031 2.143 0.293 1.135 0.553 
Personal Characteristics 
   
  
  
  
       Tenure 
 
0.856 0.884 0.888 0.911 0.969 0.914 0.834 0.811 0.789 
    Female 
 
0.151 0.159 0.101 0.089 0.1875 0.064 0.175 0.135 0.237 
    Age  
 
49.2 50 49.2 50.4 51.2 49.7 48.9 48.9 47.3 
Institutions 
   
  
  
  
       University 
 
0.65 0.609 0.489 0.769 0.688 0.479 0.605 0.541 0.526 
    Fraunhofer Society 
 
0.016 0.058 0.169 0.041 0.094 0.214 0.007 0.027 0 
    Max Planck Society 
 
0.094 0.029 0.022 0.053 0.031 0.014 0.109 0.027 0.053 
    Helmholtz Association 
 
0.146 0.13 0.180 0.065 0.063 0.164 0.177 0.189 0.237 
    Leibniz Association 
 
0.062 0.072 0.073 0.036 0.094 0.064 0.073 0.054 0.105 
    Other Institution 
 
0.076 0.116 0.101 0.059 0.063 0.093 0.082 0.162 0.132 
Science Fields 
   
  
  
  
       Life sciences 
 
0.332 0.333 0.174 0.385 0.344 0.136 0.311 0.324 0.316 
    Natural sciences 
 
0.322 0.304 0.185 0.213 0.25 0.207 0.364 0.351 0.105 
    Engineering 
 
0.13 0.116 0.522 0.266 0.219 0.55 0.077 0.027 0.421 
    Social sciences 
 
0.217 0.246 0.118 0.136 0.397 0.107 0.248 0.297 0.158 
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Our regression analysis begins by considering a binary outcome that indicates whether a 
researcher who was supported by an extramural sponsor experienced any type of publication 
delay or secrecy.  Model A in Table 4 shows the results of a basic Probit regression that ignores 
selection into extramural funding.  Model B controls for self-selection into extramural funding 
(see e.g. Wooldridge, 2002: 570, for technical details).  Holding the size of the researcher‟s 
extramural budget constant (as well as other factors), the share of industry sponsorship 
significantly increases the probability of publication delay or secrecy in both models.  The 
correlation across equations in Model B, reported at the bottom of the table as rho, is negative 
and highly significant which indicates self-selection into extramural funding is important.  
Controlling for self-selection, the coefficient estimate on industry share is 18% smaller, but still 
highly significant.  From Model B, a 10% increase in the industry share increases the probability 
that he or she will experience publication delay or secrecy by 4.4 percentage points.  At the mean 
values of the covariates, the predicted probability of experiencing delay or secrecy increases by 
17.4% from 0.253 to 0.297.  This result supports concerns that industry sponsorship undermines 
the norms and practices of open science and jeopardizes the cumulative nature and reliability of 
public scientific and technical knowledge.  A larger total extramural budget is also associated 
with greater publication restrictions. 
It is also informative to examine how other covariates influence publication delay or 
secrecy when the effects of industry share and extramural budget size are held constant.  From 
Model B, research characteristics and institutional affiliations matter even after controlling for 
selection.  A researcher who is a group leader or had more journal publications is less likely to 
experience delay or secrecy restrictions.  Group leaders and productive researchers are likely to 
value disclosure more and possess more bargaining power with extramural sponsors.  This is 
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consistent with Audretsch et al. (2010) who found group leadership to be associated with more 
cooperation experience and planned cooperation with private companies.   
Researchers who submit more patent applications are more likely to restrict publications 
either through delay or secrecy.  Relative to university researchers, those affiliated with the 
Fraunhofer Society, Helmholtz and Leibniz Associations are more likely to experience 
publication delay or secrecy.  Given our data, we cannot distinguish between an institutional 
“management” effect, reflecting the strength of the technology transfer capabilities at these 
institutions, versus an institutional “focus” effect, reflecting the relatively applied orientation of 
research at these institutions.  As described in Section 2, most of the literature has focused on 
researchers in the life sciences and its subfields.  Looking at Model A, our results indicate that 
the life sciences are not significantly more likely to experience delays or secrecy on publications 
relative to the base group of social scientists.  Only engineering researchers are more likely to 
experience these publication restrictions.  Interestingly, after controlling for selection into 
extramural sponsorship in Model B, engineering researchers are no longer significantly different 
from social scientists. 
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Table 4:  Probit of Withholding Research (binary outcome) 
 Model A Model B 
Variable Probit (no selection) 
Probit with Selection 
Second stage 
Probit with Selection 
First stage 
Industry share  1.427 *** 1.168 ***   
 (0.235)  (0.210)   
Total external funding 0.152 *** 0.111 ***   
 (0.039)  (0.033)   
Female    0.011  
    (0.116)  
Age    0.119 ** 
    (0.053)  
Age-squared    -0.001 *** 
    (0.0005)  
Research group leader 0.077  -0.352 *** 0.736 *** 
 (0.137)  (0.127) (0.106)  
Tenure -0.036  -0.091 0.209  
 (0.153)  (0.126) (0.148)  
Journal publications -0.006 *** -0.007 *** 0.007 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003)  
Patent applications 0.098 *** 0.090 *** 0.057 * 
 (0.023)  (0.022) (0.031)  
Fraunhofer Society 0.595 ** 0.542 ** -0.284  
 (0.247)  (0.224) (0.233)  
Max Planck Society -0.380  -0.089 -0.334 ** 
 (0.245)  (0.202) (0.169)  
Helmholtz Association 0.221  0.238 * -0.236 * 
 (0.151)  (0.131) (0.140)  
Leibniz Association 0.423 ** 0.368 ** -0.201  
 (0.200)  (0.173) (0.185)  
Other institution 0.301 * 0.227 -0.006  
 (0.177)  (0.157) (0.173)  
Life sciences -0.175  -0.130 -0.038  
 (0.155)  (0.131) (0.139)  
Natural sciences -0.158  -0.201 0.146  
 (0.162)  (0.137) (0.144)  
Engineering 0.390 ** 0.181 0.448 *** 
 (0.161)  (0.144) (0.164)  
Intercept -0.795 *** 0.042 -2.354 * 
 (0.206)  (0.190) (1.284)  
Log-Likelihood -415.788 -854.607 
Equation corr (rho) - -0.916*** 
# Observations 856 1060 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
Reference: male, non group leader, untenured, university,  social scientist.  
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Given the structure of the survey question, it is perhaps more natural to specify an 
ordered dependent variable with four categories (no delay or secrecy, delay of publications, 
partial secrecy on publication, and total secrecy on publication) indicating increasing levels of 
secrecy.  Model A in Table 5 reports the ordered Probit results without accounting for selection.  
The signs and statistical significance of the explanatory variables are nearly identical to those 
presented in Table 4 Model A.  When self-selection is taken into account (see Miranda and 
Rabe-Hesketh, 2006, for econometric details of the ordered Probit model with selection), as 
shown in Model B of Table 5, the results from the binary Probit analysis continue to hold.  Once 
again, controlling for self-selection reduces the coefficient estimate on industry share, but it 
remains highly significant. 
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Table 5:  Ordered Probit of Withholding Research 
 Model A Model B 
Variable 
Ordered Probit (no 
selection) 
Ordered Probit with 
Selection Second stage 
Ordered Probit with 
Selection First stage 
Industry share  1.567 *** 1.342 ***   
 (0.209)  (0.189)    
Total external funding 0.153 *** 0.129 ***   
 (0.037)  (0.030)    
Female     0.006 
     (0.118) 
Age     0.134 ** 
     (0.054) 
Age-squared     -0.002 *** 
     (0.0005) 
Research group leader 0.030  -0.348 *** 0.718 *** 
 (0.127)  (0.126)  (0.107) 
Tenure -0.069  -0.126  0.205 
 (0.144)  (0.125)  (0.147) 
Journal publications -0.006 *** -0.007 *** 0.008 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Patent applications 0.065 *** 0.053 *** 0.043 
 (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.032) 
Fraunhofer Society 0.678 *** 0.589 *** -0.273 
 (0.202)  (0.191)  (0.230) 
Max Planck Society -0.380  -0.147  -0.354 ** 
 (0.239)  (0.205)  (0.169) 
Helmholtz Association 0.251 * 0.261 ** -0.264 * 
 (0.140)  (0.126)  (0.141) 
Leibniz Association 0.393 ** 0.350 ** -0.221 
 (0.186)  (0.168)  (0.186) 
Other institution 0.287 * 0.210  -0.051 
 (0.164)  (0.151)  (0.171) 
Life sciences -0.131  -0.103  -0.034 
 (0.147)  (0.130)  (0.138) 
Natural sciences -0.169  -0.209  0.154 
 (0.154)  (0.136)  (0.144) 
Engineering 0.538 *** 0.305  0.482 *** 
 (0.149)  (0.143)  (0.163) 
Intercept     -2.665 ** 
     (1.311) 
Log-Likelihood -642.906 -1,082.116 
Equation corr (rho) - -0.834*** 
# Observations 856 1060 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).   
Reference:  male, non group leader, untenured, university, social scientist 
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4.2 Robustness test 
As a further check on the robustness of our main results, we implemented an instrumental 
variables (IV) approach to account for any endogeneity of industry budget share using an IV 
Probit model.  A valid IV for industry share must be relevant (highly correlated with industry 
share) and exogenous (independent of unobserved factors influencing the degree of disclosure 
restrictions on publications).  One survey question asked respondents “How do you evaluate the 
transparency of the referees‟ decisions regarding your proposal to the 6th European Union 
Framework program?”  Respondents had five choices on a Likert scale ranging from 1 for “very 
low” to 5 for “very high”.  This question provides a relevant IV because those researchers who 
indicated a poor opinion of the EU proposal review process are more likely to consider industry 
as an alternative extramural sponsor.  At the same time, a researcher‟s opinion about referee 
reports is arguably independent of factors that influence his or her choice about disclosure.  As a 
second IV, we used the researcher‟s gender.  These IVs were correlated with industry share in 
the first stage regression with an F-statistic of 5.3 and passed the over-identification test for 
exogeneity.   
The models used fewer observations (542) than the models reported above because 
responses about the refereeing outcomes were conditional on having applied to the 6
th
 EU 
Framework program.  The first regression reported in Table 6 is a standard binary Probit.  The 
results are quite similar to earlier results except for the science fields.  Researchers in the natural 
sciences are now significantly less likely to report publication restrictions than the base group of 
social scientists and engineers are no longer significantly different.  When an IV Probit method is 
used as shown in Model B, the coefficient on industry share remains positive and significant.  At 
the same time most of the research characteristics and institutional affiliations are no longer 
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significantly related to experiencing publication restrictions.  This suggests the effect of industry 
sponsorship was partially absorbed by research characteristics and institutional affiliation 
covariates in earlier models.  The IV Probit model also reveals more heterogeneity across science 
fields with researchers in both life sciences and natural sciences being significantly less likely to 
experience publication restrictions relative to social scientists. 
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Table 6:  Probit of Withholding Research (binary outcome, all sponsors) 
 Model A Model B 
Variable Probit IV Probit 
Industry share  1.815 *** 4.620 ** 
 (0.393)  (2.182)  
Total external funding 0.137 *** 0.152 *** 
 (0.050)  (0.047)  
Research group leader 0.031  -0.094  
 (0.172)  (0.196)  
Tenure 0.020  -0.081  
 (0.198)  (0.206)  
Journal publications -0.005 ** -0.005 * 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
Patent applications 0.081 *** 0.044  
 (0.026)  (0.047)  
Fraunhofer Society 0.671 ** 0.036  
 (0.282)  (0.661)  
Max Planck Society -0.396  -0.373  
 (0.307)  (0.291)  
Helmholtz Association 0.309 * 0.290  
 (0.181)  (0.178)  
Leibniz Association 0.670 *** 0.556 * 
 (0.242)  (0.285)  
Other institution  0.320  0.212  
 (0.211)  (0.236)  
Life sciences -0.299  -0.359 * 
 (0.205)  (0.195)  
Natural sciences -0.447 ** -0.458 ** 
 (0.213)  (0.205)  
Engineering 0.027  0.430  
 (0.212)  (0.435)  
Intercept -0.570 ** -0.388  
 (0.268)  (0.333)  
Log-Likelihood -285.914 -35.757 
# Observations 542 542 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
Reference:  male, non group leader, untenured, university, social scientist 
5 Conclusion 
Using data obtained from individual academic researchers, our evidence strongly supports the 
perspective that industry sponsorship jeopardizes public disclosure of academic research.  Firms 
expect proprietary benefits from their sponsorship relationships and realizing these benefits often 
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requires disclosure restrictions that academic researchers would not otherwise impose.  
Academic researchers who accepted industry sponsorship reported significantly more disclosure 
delays and greater secrecy.  Importantly, both the descriptive statistics and the regression models 
indicate these delay and secrecy outcomes increase as the share of industry sponsorship grows.  
While we cannot unequivocally state that this association is causal, our empirical analysis 
offered significant advances in this direction.  Selection models accounted for self-selection by 
academic researchers into extramural research funding and IV regression methods addressed 
concerns about confounding omitted characteristics or potential measurement error. 
Our microeconomic evidence provides a lens for interpreting the on-going aggregate shift 
in institutional financing that supports academic research.  As revealed in Figure 1, country-level 
OECD data show the share of industry sponsorship is generally rising, although not universally 
or monotonically.  Among OECD countries, Germany has the largest share of industry 
sponsorship, about 25% in 2007.  Our researcher-level evidence from Germany suggests the 
aggregate shift does not simply represent the substitution of private money for public, but 
involves a real change in when or if academic research findings, methods, and materials are 
publicly disclosed.  This interpretation is consistent with prior research that examined 
researchers working in a handful of science fields at American universities.  It appears the 
adverse effect of industry sponsorship on disclosure of academic research is not country specific 
or university specific, although more research is clearly needed to understand how country-level 
and institution-level characteristics influence the relationship between sponsorship and 
disclosure. 
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Figure 1:  Percentage of higher education and government R&D financed by industry 1981, 
1995, 2007 
 
Source:  OECD, Main Science and Technology Indicators 2010 
The challenge facing policymakers is to gauge the impact of disclosure restrictions on the 
quantity, quality, and evolution of academic research to better understand how these restrictions 
may ultimately influence innovation and economic growth.  This is a significant challenge and 
our study only lays the groundwork for more research.  Before policy recommendations can be 
made numerous follow-on questions must be answered.  For instance:  What is the quantity and 
nature of information delayed or withheld?  How do these disclosure restrictions affect the access 
costs, fidelity, and use of ideas that compose the stock of public scientific and technical 
knowledge?  How important is the information delayed or withheld for private returns?  What 
are the net social costs or benefits of disclosure restrictions?  At this stage of the research, 
policymakers should at least be aware that academic researchers are accepting disclosure 
restrictions in exchange for financial support by industrial sponsors.  If, as David (1994) argued, 
sponsorship relationships played an important role in the emergence of open science, it is only 
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logical that sponsorship relationships are influential enough to undermine open science norms 
and practices. 
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